Violation of environmental regulations in Sweden by Holstein, Fredrik & Gren, Ing-Marie
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
03/2013 
 
 
Violation of environmental regulations in 
Sweden: Economic motives, environmental 
attitudes, and social capital.  
 
 
 
Holstein, Fredrik 
Gren, Ing-Marie  
 
 
Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, Institutionen för ekonomi  Working Paper Series 2013:03 
   Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics  Uppsala 2013 
 
   ISSN 1401-4068 
   ISRN SLU-EKON-WPS-1303-SE Corresponding author:  
                                                                                                                                  Ing-Marie.Gren@slu.se 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Violation of environmental regulations in Sweden: Economic motives, 
environmental attitudes, and social capital.  
 
Abstract: This paper tests the explanatory power of traditional enforcement instruments, 
environmental attitudes and abundance of social capital for violation of environmental 
regulations in Sweden. A count data model is used on a panel data set obtained from a survey to 
inspectors at the local and regional jurisdictions in Sweden. Regressions analyses are carried out 
for all firms but also for different firm categories depending on environmental impacts. The 
results indicate that traditional enforcement weapons, measured as number of inspection and a 
formal inspection style, curb violation by all types of firm categories. On the other hand, 
significant results are that environmental attitudes and abundance of social capital deter violation 
by large firms, but have no impact on violation by firms with minor environmental impacts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Environmental policies are implemented by formal punishment of detected violation in most 
countries. This deters violation by creating a cost of violation in terms of expected penalty. 
However, there is a tendency in many countries to a larger extent rely on voluntary mechanisms 
for policy implementation (Gray and Shimshack, 2011).  Such a move from traditional 
enforcement can be justified if the presumption that other mechanisms than expected penalties 
have sufficient impact on firms’ environmental performance.  This question has been raised and 
analysed by a large number of studies since the seminal contribution by Becker (1968). The main 
focus since then in the economics literature has been on investigating the role of economic 
factors, in particular expected penalties from violation (see Cohen 1999 and Gray and Shimshack 
2011 reviews of empirical studies). Harrington (1988) provides one of the early recognition of 
other factors affecting compliance when he found that firms in general comply with regulations 
to a larger extent then would be expected based on only expected penalty cost and benefits from 
violation, the so called Harrington paradox.  
 
Normative and social motives have been suggested as explanatory factors for compliance with 
regulations in addition to economic motives, where the latter are defined as the direct expected 
costs and benefits from violation (McGraw and Scholz, 1991; Honneland 1999; Jensen and 
Aarset, 2008; Bouvier, 2009). Normative motives refer to the desire to fulfil one’s own moral 
beliefs, and social motives to please others. The managers of the regulated firms may themselves 
hold values about the importance/duty of following regulations in general, and environmental 
directives in particular. They may for example stress that there is a moral obligation to comply 
with the rules in a society and that there is a moral obligation to protect the environment. Social 
motives arise from the role of others perception of the firm. Even if the manager/decision maker 
holds no environmental concern, others may do so who are important for the manager such as 
employees, customers, friends and other regulated firms.  
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Another factor, abundance of social capital, has turned out to have significant influence on 
compliance with regulations in general (e.g. Glaeser et al., 1996; Lederman et al., 2002; 
Lazzarini et al., 2004; Yamamura, 2009). The term “social capital” is somewhat vaguely defined 
but is often understood as, following the use of Putnam et al. (1993), horizontal relations and 
networks acting towards reciprocity in cooperation. As such, it is related to normative and social 
motives, but the concepts differ since these motives not necessarily result in expectations of 
reciprocity in voluntary cooperation. In principle we can find three mechanisms through which 
social capital can impact violation of environmental regulations. One is through the effect on 
violating firms’ benefits from losses of access to local transactions that build on trust. The other 
two mechanisms act through suspected or detected violation. Social capital may facilitate the 
creation of lobbying activities that result in private reporting of environmental activities without 
permits, and the other is the  damaging impact on firms’ transaction by a quick and widespread 
of reputation as ‘environmental criminal’.  
 
There is a relatively large body of literature on the empirical test of the explanatory power of 
economic motives for violation of environmental regulations (see Cohen 1999 and Gray and 
Shimshack 2011 for reviews, and Hatcher et al. 2000 for a review of compliance with fishery 
regulations). The number of studies adding normative and social motives, environmental 
attitudes or social capital is much more scant (Regens et al., 1997; Hatcher et al., 2000; Kagan et 
al., 2003; Earnhart, 2004; Nostbacken, 2008; Jones, 2010). Several of these studies include 
explanatory variables reflecting social and normative motives or social capital (Regens et al. 
1997;  Earnhart 2004; Jones, 2010).  Kagan et al. (2003) is one of the few addressing the role of 
environmental attitudes. However, none of the studies is explicitly addressing the explanatory 
power of all three factors, i.e. economic motives, environmental attitudes, and social capital. 
Common to most empirical studies is their application to environmental regulations in the US 
and we find very few studies with application to environmental regulations in other countries. 
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The purpose of this paper is to estimate the explanatory power of variables categorized in the 
three categories of drivers for violation of environmental regulations in Sweden, a country in 
north-east Europe with a relatively long tradition of environmental regulations manifested by the 
hosting of the first UN environmental conference in 1972.  Econometric tests are carried out by 
using a count data modelling approach on a data set obtained from a survey to inspectors of 
compliance with regulations in Swedish at the local (municipalities) and regional (counties) 
jurisdictional levels. This survey is complemented with data from another survey to the Swedish 
population reflecting, among others, environmental attitudes and measurement of social capital 
(Holmberg et al., 2010). We see two main contributions of the paper. One is the simultaneous 
consideration of influence on violation from all three classes of factors, and the other is the 
empirical application to a country outside the U.S.   
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief literature background, and data 
retrieval is presented in Section 3. Econometric modelling and results are presented in Section 4, 
and the paper ends with a summary and discussion in Section 5.  
 
 
2. Brief literature review 
 
Several studies have tried to explain the so-called Harrington-paradox, i.e. that firms comply in 
spite of very low expected penalties (Harrington, 1988), but in different ways. A vast majority of 
the literature on compliance motives attributes the phenomenon to economic motives (Magat and 
Viscusi, 1990; Gray and Scholz, 1993; Gray and Deily, 1996; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; 
Nadeau, 1997; Winter and May, 2001; Stafford, 2002; Eckert, 2004; Shimshack and  Ward, 
2005; Nyborg and Telle, 2006; Eckert and Eckert, 2010). These studies investigate the effect on 
compliance of inspection design (including inspection frequency, threat of inspections, and 
inspections based on violation history and spread among regulated firms), and/or level of 
penalties. This section gives a very brief survey of these studies and we refer to Gray and 
Shimshak (2011) for a much more elaborative and comprehensive review. 
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Inspection design is the most commonly studied explanatory variable where Magat and Viscusi 
(1990) is one of the earliest study. They found that inspections have a positive effect on 
compliance in the paper and pulp industry in US, but that the regulation for that industry was an 
unusual success compared to other environmental regulations.  In a study by Gray and Deily 
(1996) the positive relationship between compliance with regulations by steel mills in US and 
inspections frequency was confirmed. Nadeau (1997) made an econometric test of the ability of 
US EPA to reduce the time plants in the paper and pulp industry spend in a state of violation and 
found that the time period can be reduced by EPA’s monitoring and enforcement activities.   
 
Threat of inspection was considered by Laplante and Rilstone (1996) who showed that both 
actual and threat of inspections have significant effect on emissions of pollutants from the paper 
and pulp industry in Quebec. A significant impact of inspection warnings was found also by 
Eckert (2004) for compliance with regulations on petroleum storages in Canada. The same data 
set was used by Eckert and Eckert (2010) who showed that state dependent inspections and 
violation history of the inspected and neighbouring sites affect compliance. These results 
confirm earlier finding on a positive impact on compliance from state dependent inspection (e.g. 
Gray and Deily, 1996; Shimshack and Ward, 2005).  
 
Impacts on compliance from changes in the penalty levels turn out to have some but relatively 
small effects (Winter and May, 2001;  Gray and Scholz, 1993; Stafford, 2002).  Nyborg and 
Telle (2006) provide one of the few studies of compliance outside US and Canada. Based on 
firm level panel data in Norway they found that violation is relatively high for firms facing lax 
enforcement and punishment, but low when expected penalty is harsh.  
 
Another, but much less investigated, factor is the role of inspectors’ behaviour and attitudes 
when controlling regulated firms, or the inspection style (Harrison, 1995; Laplante and Rilstone, 
1996; Eckert, 2004). The inspection style may, as has been pointed out by political scientists,  be  
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regarded as confronting if detection and punishing are in focus for the inspector or as cooperative 
if information and advising are in focus (Lundqvist, 1980; Vogel, 2003). These two inspection 
styles were compared by Harrison (1995) who found that the more confronting inspection style 
in US lead to higher compliance in the paper and pulp industry than the more cooperative style in 
Canada. Burby and Paterson (1993) showed, on the other hand, that cooperative enforcement 
strategies can improve the compliance with laws urban sedimentation and erosion control in the 
State of North Carolina.  
 
An unusual explanation of the existence of over compliance is suggested by Brännlund and 
Löfgren (1995), who point at the role of asymmetric information within firms. Since a manager 
does not have full control of all employees activities, there is a risk of unintentional violation of 
environmental regulations. They found that the paper and pulp industry in Sweden responds to 
this by reducing the average emissions more than required by the regulation. This can be 
attributed to economic motives and the risk of costly sanctions if found in violation, but also to 
environmental concern. 
 
Studies on the explanatory power of variables reflecting non-economic motives not directly 
effecting regulated firms’ expected profits from violation are much more scant (Regens et al., 
1997; Kagans, 2003; Earnhart, 2004; Jones, 2010).  A common approach in these studies has 
been to capture non-economic factors by measurements of different community characteristics, 
such as voting engagement and education. Regens et al. (1997) found that political factors 
influenced the investments in pollution control equipment in the US manufacturing industry. 
Earnhart (2004) included factors as population density, unemployment rate, voter engagement, 
education, income per capita and proportion of renter households and showed that such 
community characteristics affected the compliance level. Kagan et al. (2003) found that local 
governments, environmental activists and company culture were important factors to explain 
over compliance.  
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Several of these community characteristics, such as voter engagement, can be attributed to the  
role of social capital for compliance with regulations in general (e.g. Glaeser et al., 1996; 
Lederman et al., 2002; Yamamura,  2009;  McCulloch et al., 2012).  Two central elements in the 
parameterization of social capital is the membership in organisations and the degree of social 
trust (Rothstein, 2003).  Using data from a survey of citizens in Greece, Jones (2010) tested the 
impact on compliance with waste treatment regulations from four different measurements of 
trust, all of which refer to trust in general or networking. It was found that general trust has 
significant impact on environmental behaviour.   
  
 
3 Data retrieval 
 
The brief review in Section 2 identified several common explanatory variables for compliance 
with environmental regulations, where the most frequently used variable is enforcement in terms 
of inspections of regulated firms. Such a variable is also included in this paper, together with a 
variable reflecting inspection style, since they affect firms’ perceptions of credibility in enforcing 
regulations. It is more difficult to discern a common denominator for the choice of other 
explanatory variables, but we can identify variables reflecting environmental attitudes and social 
capital as relatively frequent. Before presenting choice of variables and associated data 
collection, we give a brief presentation of the Swedish context of supervision of environmental 
regulations. 
 
 
3.1 Brief description of enforcement of Swedish environmental regulations 
 
 
Supervision of environmental regulations in Sweden is made for command and control policies 
and is divided among three authorities: the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA, 
2009), County Administrative Boards (CAB), and municipalities. The SEPA has the overall 
responsibility for supervising environmental regulations, and the operative responsibility is  
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delegated to CAB and municipalities, where each jurisdictional unit obtains a given number of 
firms to supervise. These firms are classified into four different categories -  A, B, C, and U – 
according to the Environmental Protection Act. Firms classified into the A and B categories 
require licences issued by CAB for operation, where an A classified firm is more 
environmentally hazardous than a B classified firm.  Examples of A classified firms are nuclear 
power plants and firms operating in the steel, paper or pulp industries. Large farms and food 
producers provide examples of B classified firms. The C classified firms have to report their 
activities to the municipalities, and the U classified firms, such as petrol stations and laundries, 
need neither license nor reporting about their activities but are under observation by the 
municipalities for classification into any other class. 
 
The CABs have the responsibility for supervision of firms classified in the A and B categories 
and municipalities for the C and U categories. However, upon voluntary request from 
municipalities, counties are allowed to delegate responsibility for supervising the A and B 
classified firms to the municipalities.  According to Gren and Li (2012) the total number of 
regulated firms amounts to approximately 82000, of which a vast majority, 89%, are U firms and 
C firms, and 10% and 1% are B and A firms respectively.  These firms are divided among 21 
CABs and 287 municipalities. Supervision of approximately 30% of the A and firms are 
delegated to municipalities upon their request.  
 
 
3.2 Variable definitions and measurement 
 
The econometric test of the influence of these explanatory variables relies on two main data 
sources; i) a survey with questionnaires to all Swedish inspection authorities distributed in 2009 
(Holstein, 2010), and ii) poll investigations of attitudes of the Swedish citizens carried out since 
early 1980s (Holmberg et al., 2010). Ordinal data on violation by regulated firms and inspection 
behaviour were obtained from the questionnaire, and categorical data on variables representing 
environmental attitudes and social capital were found in the poll investigation.  
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The main and unique data source for this study is the survey to municipality and CAB inspection 
authorities carried out in 2008 (Holstein, 2010).  Out of 287 municipalities, 79 (27%) answered 
the questionnaire after two follow up surveys. In fact these represented 90 (31%) of the 
municipalities since some of them cooperate in their supervision. Out of 21 counties seven (33%) 
answered. In the questionnaire the authorities were asked to state the number of objects in each 
category, A, B, C, and U, for which they were supervising authority for the years 2005, 2006 and 
2007. They were also asked to state the number of inspections/visits that were accomplished per 
year and firm category (A, B, C and U respectively).  Thus, this survey contains data on total 
firms and firms in different categories, NF, inspections,  InsF, and  violations, ViolF, where 
F=all,A,B,C,U. Due to the short time perspective the commonly used explanatory variable on 
state dependent inspections could not be constructed. 
 
The survey also contained questions on inspection style, which can be measured along two 
dimensions; whether the authority perceives its duties to supervise compliance or to provide 
information, and, given that the main task is regarded as supervision of compliance, whether the 
inspector uses ‘strict’ or ‘soft’ supervision. The ‘strict’ style is regarded as a relative formal 
approach to firms and the ‘soft’ as more of making friends (Johannesson et al., 1999).  In the 
questionnaire inspection authorities were asked for their perceptions of themselves as being 
advisor-supervisor along a 0-100 scale where 0 is pure supervisor and 100 is a pure advisor. The 
same scale was used for assessing the perception of being soft versus strict where 0 is purely soft 
and 100 is entirely strict or formal. The variables are denoted Insadv and Insfor respectively. 
 
The municipalities and counties differ considerably with respect to wealth and income where the 
urban regions with the largest cities have the highest average income. This may reflect 
opportunities for firms to earn income, which may have a negative or positive effect on violation. 
Following Earnhaert (2004) we therefore include income per capita, Inc, as an explanatory 
variables. If it reflects firms’ losses of incomes from complying with regulations, it should have  
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a positive impact on violation. If it instead is negative, it can be interpreted as profits showing 
firms’ affordability to comply with regulations.  
 
Data on explanatory variables not directly related to economic motives, environmental attitudes 
and social capital, are obtained from a regular poll survey of Swedish citizens attitudes 
(Holmberg et al., 2010). The statistics report results from attitudes towards a number of different 
social concerns, where environmental attitudes are represented in two categories; general 
environmental attitudes and organisation in environmental organisations. We use both these 
variables in our regression equations; general environmental interests, Envint, and activity in 
environmental organisation, Envorg.  For both these variables people were asked to rank their 
general interest in environmental questions on a scale where 1 indicates “very interested”, 2 
“fairly interested, 3 “not very interested” and 4 “not interested at all”. Hence, if more interest 
means higher compliance the variable Envint should have a positive sign as explanatory variable 
to violation. The variable for environmental organisation, Envorg, is indexed in the opposite 
way, where a higher index, ranging from 1-5, implies higher level of activity. 
 
Variables for two parameterizations of social capital, organisational engagement and general 
trust, are used in this study. Data on both variables are obtained from (Holmberg et al., 2010) as 
cardinal measurements. The variable, engagement in organisations, denoted  Org,  constitutes a 
cardinal measurement where people were asked about their level of engagement in different 
organisations. Here, 1 indicates “not member”, 2 “member but have not participated in any 
meeting last year”, 3 “member and have participated in meeting last year”, and 4 “member with 
some kind of commission”. The variable for general trust, Trust , is measured on a cardinal scale 
between 0 and 10, where 0 is no trust and 10 is full trust on ‘people in general’.  
 
In addition to these explanatory variables, we introduce dummy variables for two years, D2005 
and D2006, and for inspection authority, Dauth, which is 1 for a county and 0 for a municipality. 
In order to avoid too much influence of out layers a dummy is introduced for very large  
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violations, Dlarge, which is 1 for violations exceeding 400 and 0 otherwise. All variables with 
abbreviations, explanation, and data sources are presented in Table 1 followed by descriptive 
statistics in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Abbreviations, description of variables and data sources 
 
Dependent variables: 
ViolF             violations of  F classified firms where F=all, A,B,C,U 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Economic motives; 
InsF          number of inspections of F classified firms where F=all, A.B,C,U 
                         (Holstein, 2010) 
Insfor      index of inspection style as formal (Holstein, 2010) 
Insadv    index of inspection style and confronting (Holstein) 
Inc            income/capita, 1000 SEK/year (SCB, 2010) 
Environmental attitudes; 
Envint            general environmental interest (Holmberg et al., 2010)  
Envorg           organisational engagement in environmental organisations (Holmberg et al., 2010) 
Social capital; 
Trust           trust index  (Holmberg et al., 2010) 
Org           organizational engagement (Holmberg et al., 2010) 
Others; 
NF                 number of F classified firms where F=all, A,B,C,U (Holstein, 2010)  
Dauth          dummy for county inspection 
D2006          dummy for year 2006 
D2005          dummy for year 2005 
Dlarge          dummy for number of violations > 400  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables n Mean Stand. 
dev. 
Minim
um 
Maxim
um 
Dependent 
variables: 
     
Violall 258 43 124 0 1080 
ViolA 74 1.6 4.7 0 26 
ViolB 197 8.1 28 0 275 
ViolC 230 16 34 0 200 
ViolU 198 26 106 0 889 
Explanatory 
variables: 
     
Nall 258 233 352 7 2955 
NA 77 5.5 7.2 1 46 
NB 197 27 44 1 290 
NC 230 75 72 14 548 
NU 198 187 317 2 2339 
Insall 258 49 58 0 380 
InsA 77 7.3 17 0 111 
InsB 197 13 18 0 114 
InsC 230 23 31 0 211 
InsU 198 22 30 0 149 
Insfor 225 58 27 10 100 
Insadv 234 38 17 10 90 
Inc 258 213 26 174 372 
Envorg 258 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.3 
Envint 258 2.2 0.2 1.9 2.6 
Trust 258 6.4 0.4 5.3 7.0 
Org 258 1.4 0.1 1.2 1.9 
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics show that average number of U-classified firms is approximately 34 
times larger than that of A-classified firms, which is in line with the entire population measured 
in early 1990s (Gren and Li, 2011). On the other hand, the average level of violation among A-
classified firms is approximately 16 times larger than that of U firms. It can also be noted that in 
average, an A classified firm is inspected 1.33 times during the three year period, and a U  
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classified firm 0.12 times.  This may imply that the practice of spending relatively much budget 
resources for inspecting large firms in early 1990s shown by Gren and Li (2011) is exercised also 
in the period 2005-2007. We can also note from the descriptive statistics that the standard 
deviations of the response variables are quite large relative to the means, which may be an 
indication of over-dispersion. 
 
4 Econometric models and results 
 
 
In order to test the explanatory power of the different independent variables displayed in Tables 
1 and 2, we carry out regressions for all firms and for different firm categories. A quadratic 
‘production function’ of violation in inspections is specified, and the regression equation is then 
written as  
 
Fit
FFFF
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F
it
F
it
F
it
F
it
F
it
F
it
F
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F
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F
Fit
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Fit
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+++++=
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where F=all, A, B, C, U firm categories and  Fitε  is the error term. 
 
The response variable, number of violating firms, is characterised as an event count, i.e. the 
realisation of a non-negative positive integers (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Ordinary least 
square method then gives rise to biased and inefficient estimates, and researchers have therefore 
developed nonlinear models that are based on Poisson or negative binomial distributions (e.g. 
Long, 1997). A Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution where the probability 
that an event occurs in a given time interval is independent from the occurrence of the last event 
but at a known average rate, implying that the mean equals the variance. Thus the number of 
occurrences fluctuates around its mean. Since the variance in the response variable is  
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considerably larger than the mean (see Table 2), the dispersion parameter is statistically 
significant and we therefore apply a negative binomial regression model, which is written with 
the dependent variables, ViolF, as a random variable and FiViol number of occurrences 
 
!
(Pr
Fi
y
Fi
u
FiF Viol
eViolViolob
FiFiµ−
=                                                                                     (2) 
and          Fi
F
FiFi x εβµ += 'ln                                                                           (3) 
 
where μFi is the average frequency of  the dependent variable, xFi is a vector of explanatory 
variables, βF is a vector of estimated coefficients,  and Fieµ  is a Gamma distribution with mean 1 
and variance α, which is a measure of dispersion. When α=0 the probability distribution is a 
Poisson. We therefore display likelihood ratio tests of α=0 when presenting the regression 
estimates.  
 
However, the data contains a relatively large number of observations with the value zero on the 
response variable, which is displayed in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Frequency of the dependent variable Violall 
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Zero can arise when violation is present but not detected, but also as a true non-existent violation 
in the region. In order to account for these possibilities we will test methods that account for two 
processes; one for the existence of zeros and the other for the magnitude of the dependent 
variable.  The expected count is then expressed as a combination of both these processes, i.e. the 
probability that the firm violates but is not detected and the probability of no violation given an 
inspection. 
 
We might expect the independent variables InsF to be endogenous in the perspective of the local 
supervision authority since they are determined by perception of compliance and budget 
resources. If so, the estimators will not give consistent estimates. An augmented Hausmann test 
was therefore carried out with labour, community characteristics, and number of firms to 
regulate as independent variables (e.g Davidson and McKinnon, 1993). The result did not reveal 
endogenous InsF at the 10% confidence level. Another problem may arise from the existence of 
multicollinearity, which affects the precision of the coefficient estimates in all models. The 
correlation matrix (Table A1 in the appendix) does not show high correlation coefficients 
between any explanatory variables.  
 
Tests were also carried out for the existence of heteroscedasticy, which turned out to be present. 
We therefore use robust estimates for all models. In Table 3 we present results from OLS and 
count data regressions with Violall as dependent variable. The count data regressions are 
presented with and without corrections for large number of zeros, Standard and Zero inflated 
respectively. 
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     Table 3: Results from robust OLS and count data regression estimates 
                    for all firm categories, n=213.  
Variables OLS 
 
Coeff.     p value 
Negative binomial: 
Standard                   Zero inflated 
Coeff.     p value        Coeff.         p value 
Intercept -157.9 0.087 0.121 0.975 -1.19 0.678 
Insall 0.522 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.014 0.000 
Insall2 -0.001 0.006 -0.46-4 0.000 -0.273-4 0.000 
Nall -0.011 0.112 1.93-4 0.713 5.59-4 0.000 
Inc 0.072 0.526 0.006 0.358 0.013 0.001 
Insfor -0.755 0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.021 0.000 
Insadv -0.326 0.100 -0.004 0.581 -0.003 0.680 
Envorg -83.63 0.185 -6.26 0.000 -4.39 0.000 
Envint 51.18 0.043 1.80 0.032 2.05 0.005 
Trust 10.63 0.139 0.221 0.480 0.252 0.355 
Org 61.91 0.078 2.01 0.078 0.305 0.760 
Dlarge 206.1 0.000 0.481 0.288 0.731 0.044 
Dauth -13.02 0.069 -1.89 0.000 -1.38 0.001 
D2005 0.629 0.943 -0.013 0.953 0.205 0.252 
D2006 0.639 0.937 0.081 0.696 0.110 0.509 
Inflate:    
Intercept   -0.503 0.111 
Insall   -0.012 0.108 
Adj. R2 0.63   
Log 
likelihood 
-1119.397 -801.80 -775.389 
Wald  570.82 477.37 
LR test of α  p=0.000 p=0.000 
Voung test   p=0.000 
 
 
The results presented in Table 3 show that the skewed distribution of the dependent variable is 
manifested in the LR test of α, which clearly shows the better performance of the negative 
binomial estimates. The Voung test reveals inflated zeros, and the negative sign of the coefficient 
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 of the inflated variable Insall  in the logistic regression shows that the log odds of being 
excessive zero decrease for every additional inspection, or, put it differently, the more visits in 
the group the lower is likelihood for an undetected violation. 
 
Common significant results to all models are the positive coefficient of the linear and quadratic 
components of Insall, the negative coefficient of Insfor and Dauth, and the positive effect of 
Envint. The positive linear coefficient of Insall  is surprising, but the negative coefficient of the 
quadratic term point at a peak where violation starts to decrease at higher levels of inspections or 
punishments. This peak level occurs, for the count data models, at 250 which correspond to the 
average level of inspections. Instead, inspection style, in particular formal treatment of firms, 
turns out to have significant mitigation effect on violation. It is also interesting to note that an 
advisory in contrast to a confronting strategy has a negative effect on violation, but the estimated 
coefficient is significant only in one of the regression models.  
 
The estimated coefficients of two variables reflecting environmental attitudes, Envint and 
Envorg, show expected and robust signs (recall that the index for Envint is higher for lower 
interest), and that for Envorg is also significant in two models.  On the contrary, none of the 
social capital variables show any significant impact. We would expect the Trust and Org 
coefficients to be negative if higher level of social capital curbs violation. However, the signs of 
these coefficients are positive in all models.   
 
When choosing among the models in Table 3, the results of the LR test of α and the Voung test 
of zero inflation clearly favours the zero inflated negative binomial model. The main results for 
this model indicate that economic motives, as measured by inspections and inspection styles, and 
environmental attitudes, in terms of environmental organisation and interest, affect violation.  In 
contrast, the chosen variables on social capital do not show any significant impact.  
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The pattern of results for all firms presented in Table 3 is partly reproduced for separate 
regressions of firm classes, see Table 4. The zero inflated negative binomial model is used for all 
firm categories except for A firms. 
 
Table 4: Results from zero inflated count data regressions for different firm types 
 A firms, n=58: 
(Poisson 
standard) 
Coeff.     p value 
B firms, n=164: 
(Negative 
binomial) 
Coeff.     p value 
C firms, n=192; 
(Negative 
binomial) 
Coeff.     p value 
U firms, n=172: 
(Negative 
binomial) 
Coeff.     p value 
Intercept 91.436 0.057 -25.341 0.008 -0.021 0.995 1.208 0.777 
InsF 0.070 0.010 -0.044 0.004 0.032 0.000 0.026 0.004 
InsF 2 -4.16-4 0.129 2.861-4 0.068 -1.505-4 0.000 -1.9-4 0.007 
NF 0.270 0.029 0.019 0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.062 
Inc -0.062 0.005 0.028 0.000 0.007 0.181 0.020 0.007 
Insfor -0.102 0.012 -0.015 0.007 -0.013 0.001 -0.025 0.000 
Insadv 0.014 0.420 -0.001 0.914 0.003 0.657 -0.010 0.202 
Envorg -29.197 0.082 -13.186 0.000 -1.229 0.490 -3.521 0.163 
Envint -0.903 0.829 4.598 0.000 1.769 0.025 0.378 0.672 
Trust -5.927 0.053 0.046 0.927 0.429 0.127 -0.032 0.921 
Org -4.786 0.663 17.998 0.000 -3.015 0.006 1.106 0.619 
Large 0.927 0.280 2.158 0.000 0.697 0.053 2.035 0.000 
Dauth 0.708 0.577 -2.641 0.000     
D2005 1.086 0.094 0.327 0.270 0.034 0.855 0.505 0.050 
D2006 0.701 0.240 0.386 0.176 -0.020 0.911 0.171 0.452 
Inflate:         
Intercept   1.347 0.000 -0.209 0.357 0.537 0.012 
InsI   -0.329 0.000 -0.010 0.251 -0.041 0.000 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-39.75 -303.94 -574.54 -453.44 
Wald 124.77 237.14 239.50 199.12 
LR test of α p=1.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 
Voung test p=0.549 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.002 
 
 
The results presented in Table 4 show satisfactory statistical results for all firm categories, where 
the test results reveal the need for zero inflated negative binominal model for all categories 
except the A firms. The number of observations is relatively small for this category which may 
explain the relatively low values of overall test results as shown by the Wald test. 
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One of the main results in Table 4 is that all three categories of variables, i.e. economic, 
environmental attitudes, and social capital, have impacts on violation by A, B, and C firms, but 
only economic variables act on U firms’ violation. The U firms face the lowest environmental 
requirements, and the results indicate that only traditional enforcement activities affect their 
compliance.   
 
Traditional enforcement also impacts violation by the A, B, and C firms but acts together with 
environmental attitude and social capital variables, but in slightly different ways. For these three 
firm categories, one of the environmental attitude variables is significant and has the expected 
sign.  This is also the case for the social capital variables for the A and C but not the B firms.  
For the B firm category, the Org variable is positive, which is unexpected. On the other hand, 
both variables for environmental attitudes affect the violation by this firm category.  It may be 
argued that Envorg can be regarded as a ‘green’ social capital variable, which shows significant 
effect on B firms’ violation.   
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to test the explanatory power of three classes of factors 
affecting firms’ violation behaviour; economic motives, environmental attitudes, and social 
capital. A survey to Swedish inspectors at the municipality and county jurisdictional levels 
provides the main data source, which allows for testing violation behaviour for different firm 
categories.  A count data model was used, which also adjusted for the relatively large number of 
observations with zero value on the dependent variable.  
 
One of the main results from the econometric regressions is that traditional enforcement 
mechanisms, measured by number of inspections and inspection style, act on all firms and firm 
categories. In particular, the results indicate that a formal inspection style curbs violation, but an  
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advisory in contrast to confronting style has no significant impacts on violation by any firm 
category. The latter finding is in contrast with the findings in Burby and Patterson (1993).  
 
In contrast to economic factors, variables reflecting environmental attitudes and social capital do 
not show clear and significant effects on violation by all firm categories. The category with the 
smallest firms with respect to environmental regulations responds only to traditional 
enforcement. On the other hand, violation by firms with the largest environmental impact and 
regulatory stringency is curbed by positive environmental attitudes and abundance of social 
capital in the community.  Thus, our results are in accordance with other studies indicating the 
importance of traditional monitoring and enforcement activities for managers’ decisions with 
respect to compliance with environmental regulations.  For example, Delmas and Toffel (2008) 
showed in a survey of U.S. industrial manager that formal regulations and law have more 
influence on environmental performance than community organisations or media. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that the empirical research on the role of non-economic motives for 
violation is in a relatively early phase compared with that on traditional enforcement parameters 
and more research is needed to measure and test different variables reflecting non-economic 
motives.  
 
A policy conclusion from the results obtained in this paper is thus to apply a precautionary 
approach with respect to reliance on voluntary mechanisms for implementation of environmental 
policies. While traditional enforcement instruments, in terms of monitoring and inspecting firms, 
deter violation by all firm categories, other mechanisms can be more selective. Relatively large 
firms seem to be more responsive to environmental attitudes and abundance of social capital than 
small firms. Considering that the number of small firms can be quite large, accounting for 
approximately 64% of all regulated firms in Sweden, traditional enforcement weapons may be 
necessary to reach targets set by environmental regulations.  
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Appendix: Table A1 
  
 
 Table A1: Correlation matrix    
 Viol 
all 
Ins 
all 
All Inc Ins 
for 
Ins 
adv 
Env 
org 
Env 
int 
Org Tru
st 
Larg
e 
D 
auth 
D 
2005 
D 
2006 
Violall 1              
Insall .54 1             
All .15 .10 1            
Inc -.01 -.02 .12 1           
Insfor -.31 -.12 -.20 -.05 1          
Insadv -.01 -.12 .03 .09 .21 1         
Envorg -.08 .02 -.07 -.09 -.01 -.07 1        
EnvInt .16 -.01 -.12 -.18 -.04 .11 .02 1       
Org -,04 -.07 .01 -.10 .12 .18 .26 -.20 1      
Trust -.03 -.09 .08 .19 .01 -.09 -.18 -.30 .17 1     
Large .68 .51 .23 -.05 -.03 -.02 -.08 .10 -.02 -.03 1    
Dauth -.14 -.10 -.12 -.02 .24 .22 -.10 -.02 .02 .02 -.06 1   
D2005 -.00 -.02 -.01 -.22 -.03 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.00 .00 .00 -.01 1  
D2006 -.01 -.03 .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 .01 .01 .00 .01 .00 .01 -.49 1 
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